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1
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are labor economists and social scientists listed in Appendix A. Amici have substantial
expertise in employment discrimination or the harmful effects of discrimination on older individuals and
the labor market. Amici are interested in this case because stronger anti-discrimination laws improve older
workers’ chances of being hired, benefitting them and
the economy.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hiring discrimination against older workers was
the central problem that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) sought to address; that
much is clear from the Act’s extensive legislative history. Yet, research shows that age discrimination in
hiring remains pervasive. Managers often hold negative age-related stereotypes – for example, that older
workers are slow, or resistant to new technology –
which too easily infect hiring decisions. Thus, older jobseekers fare much worse than their younger counterparts in finding work, placing them at risk of poverty.
1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation of this brief. No person other than
the amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to
the preparation or submission of this brief. Correspondence evidencing the parties’ consent to the filing of this brief are on file
with the clerk. The parties were notified ten days prior to the due
date of this brief of the intention to file.

2
Stronger anti-discrimination law helps older
workers find new jobs more easily, much as antidiscrimination law has helped reduce race and sex
discrimination. Moreover, one can infer based on research on sex and race discrimination that disparate
impact liability helps to reduce employer reliance on
age stereotypes in hiring and to prompt managerial
change.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING WAS
CONGRESS’ CENTRAL CONCERN IN ENACTING THE ADEA

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) opens with Congress’ first and central finding: “In the face of rising productivity and affluence,
older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their
efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain
employment when displaced from jobs.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 621(a)(1) (emphasis added). The history of the
ADEA’s passage reveals that “especially” is an understatement. Discrimination in hiring was, overwhelmingly, the problem Congress enacted the ADEA to
address. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 90-723, at 4 (1967) (“Senate Report”) at 4 (the “primary purpose of the bill” is
“the hiring of older workers”); accord H.R. Rep. No. 90805 at 1 (1967) (“it is the purpose of [the ADEA] to promote the employment of older workers based on their
ability”); Statement of Sen. Javits, Age Discrimination
in Employment: Hearing on S. 830 and S. 788 Before

3
the S. Subcomm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1967) at 28 (“I think
we all agree on the ultimate objective of this hearing:
that is, to report a meaningful bill to protect the opportunities of older workers to find employment”); Statement of Rep. Dent, 113 Cong. Rec. 34746 (1967) (“the
problem addressed . . . is so obvious that to belabor it
is to dull it. I am talking about the frustration and failure many workers incur in trying to gain employment
when they happen to be 40, 50, or even 60 years of
age”). Indeed, the fact that hiring discrimination dominated the debate is perhaps the most surprising aspect of the legislative record to the contemporary
reader.
In Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005),
this Court held that the ADEA includes a disparate impact cause of action, subject to the defense provided by
its “reasonable factors other than age” provision. “It is
a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the
words of a statute must be read in their context and
with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U.S.
93, 101 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Did
Congress create a disparate-impact cause of action under the ADEA, only to exclude hiring discrimination
from its application? One should hesitate before concluding that the ADEA “adopted such a topsy-turvy approach.” Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (2016)
(Roberts, C.J.)

4
The Wirtz Report (Dep’t of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment, Report of the Secretary of Labor Under Section 715 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1965), reprinted in U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Legislative
History of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Doc. No. 5 (1981)) was central to the development of
the ADEA, and has been central to this Court’s understanding of the statute. See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at
232-33, 238; General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 587-88, 590 (2004). The Wirtz Report was prepared by Secretary of Labor W. Willard
Wirtz in 1965 by order of Congress, and was based
upon (and contained a separate volume of ) detailed
and accessible governmental labor market research
studies. Wirtz Report, Letter of Transmittal; Wirtz Report, Research Materials iii (“Research Materials”)
(identifying participating agencies). The overarching
concern raised by the Wirtz Report was discrimination
in hiring (accord Barbara Lindemann, et al., Age Discrimination in Employment Law 1-5 (2d ed. 2015)), and
the prevalence of hiring discrimination was extensively documented in the accompanying research materials.
The Wirtz Report identifies the fact that “employers and supervisors often rate their own older workers
high in overall performance, but are at the same time
reluctant to hire new employees in the same age brackets,” Wirtz Report at 9, as the central puzzle of hiring
discrimination. The Report points to numerous practices that contribute to this puzzle. For example, the

5
Report and its studies discuss the arbitrary use of “categorical” age restrictions (including preferences for “recent college graduates,” Research Materials at 113);
they also note the pre-employment use of “formal employment standard[s],” such as high-school diploma requirements, Wirtz Report at 3, to provide “evidence of
desirable personal characteristics” rather than to
“measure or contribute to job performance,” Research
Materials at 67.
Later sections of the Wirtz Report note in greater
detail the “forces of circumstance” that affect the hiring
of older workers, Wirtz Report at 11. These include differences (e.g., in educational attainment, id. at 11-13,
and health status, id. at 11) that are, at least in some
cases, relevant to job performance. In addition, the
Wirtz Report discusses “institutional arrangements
that indirectly restrict the employment of older workers.” Id. at 15. These include “a broad range of personnel programs and practices,” id., such as seniority
systems, employee benefit plans, and promotion-fromwithin policies, 2 some of which provide security for already-employed older workers but “ironically” create

2

Even in 1967, there was reason to question the reasonableness of excluding older workers under these policies. See Senate
Report at 269 (testimony of John Willard, National Employment
Association (a trade group of employment agencies) (“in the fluid
and dynamic state that our business economy is in at the present
time,” employers cannot count on the ambitious young worker
staying around long enough to be available for promotion in the
course of “orderly succession”).

6
obstacles to the hiring of displaced older workers. Id.
at 2; see also Research Materials at 59-60.3
As to these factors, Congress made choices: it used
express exclusions for some, but not for others. In the
case of bona fide seniority systems and employee benefit plans, the bill was amended at Senator Javits’
strong suggestion to craft a partial exemption aimed
at removing this obstacle to hiring. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(f )(2); S. Rep. No. 90-723, at 4 (1967); id. at 13 (Individual Views of Mr. Javits). But except in the case of
seniority systems and benefit plans, Congress rejected
the use of exemptions. In the case of age-restricted
management training programs, for example, the
House rejected an amendment sought by industry that
would have exempted such programs. The reason was
overbreadth: “[a]lmost any training, or opportunity for
acquiring experience on the job, might be construed as
leading to future advancement to management positions.” H.R. Rep. No. 90-805 at 4 (1967). Similarly, the
3

The dissent in Smith used the Wirtz Report’s distinction
between “arbitrary discrimination” on the one hand and these
“circumstances” and “institutional arrangements” on the other to
argue against the availability of disparate impact claims under
the ADEA, 544 U.S. at 255-56 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), but that
position was rejected by the Court. Reviewing these same passages of the Wirtz Report – passages all of which concerned hiring
discrimination – the Smith Court concluded that Congress’ response to these issues was to allow disparate impact claims under
the ADEA, but subject to the “narrower” “reasonable factors other
than age” defense. 544 U.S. at 240-41 (Stevens, J., opinion of the
Court) (discussing the Wirtz Report and holding that “the RFOA
provision reflects” the differences between age discrimination and
“race or other classifications protected by Title VII”).

7
House Report noted that in some industries there were
acknowledged concentrations of older workers, and
that the hiring of younger workers might be justified
by the need to maintain a measure of age balance in
the workforce. Id. at 7. In both of these cases, Congress
called for case-by-case assessment of the adverse impact of such programs on older workers balanced
against the need for such programs. Id. (“it is expected
that the Secretary will recognize these particular situations and treat them according to their individual
merits on a case-by-case basis”); accord Senate Report
at 7 (calling for the statute to be “administered” in a
way that is sensitive to age-balance issues in industries with high concentrations of older workers).4
The Wirtz Report closes by calling for “a national
policy with respect to hiring on the basis of ability rather than age,” which would result in increasing the
availability of jobs for older workers. Wirtz Report at
23. The ADEA was Congress’ answer to that call, and
the disparate impact cause of action is a crucial part of
it. The ADEA’s “reasonable factors other than age” defense (which, per Smith, is the defense applicable to
disparate impact claims) is well-designed to permit the
kind of case-by-case analysis proposed by the House
4

See also Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearing on
H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768, and H.R. 4221 Before the Gen. Subcomm.
on Labor, Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 68
(1967) (statement of Rep. Dent, noting, over industry objections,
that “many employers use [educational requirements] as their
dodge or coverup for not wanting to employ a person over 40 years
of age” and that the ADEA would require employers to “consider
the effect” of such requirements).
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and Senate Reports. As this Court explained in Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523
(2015), “reasonableness” defenses to disparate impact
claims exist to allow for countervailing “legitimate concerns,” particularly those which serve interests that
are themselves consistent with the goals of the statute.
“To be sure, the [Fair Housing Act] framework may not
transfer exactly to the [age-discrimination] context,
but the comparison suffices for present purposes.” Id.
The need for sensitivity in the application of the disparate impact standard is not reason to exclude it from
the “heartland,” id. at 2522, of the ADEA – which is the
problem of hiring discrimination.
II.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH SHOWS
THAT AGE DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING
REMAINS PERVASIVE
A. Older Workers Face Discrimination in
Hiring

Age discrimination in hiring has not disappeared
in the ADEA’s wake. There is significant scholarly consensus that age discrimination, especially at the hiring
stage, “remains pervasive.” David Neumark & Joanne
Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimination Laws Make Social Security Reforms More Effective? 108 J. Pub. Econ.
1, 1-2 (2013) (citing studies); see also Scott J. Adams &
David Neumark, Age Discrimination in U.S. Labor
Markets: A Review of the Evidence, in Handbook on the
Economics of Discrimination 203 (William M. Rogers
III, ed., 2006). A recent review of literature on age

9
discrimination concluded that, despite differences in
methodological approaches, “[t]he main studies almost
uniformly find evidence of age discrimination in hiring.” David Neumark, Experimental Research on Labor
Market Discrimination, 54 (2016), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w22022 (forthcoming J. Econ. Literature).
Studies find that older workers fare worse than their
younger counterparts “in terms of unemployment duration, the probability of getting hired, their incidence
of displacement and the consequences of displacement
in terms of reemployment earnings.” Adams & Neumark, Age Discrimination in US Labor Markets, supra,
at 206; Lora A. Phillips Lassus, Steven Lopez, & Vincent J. Roscigno, Aging Workers and the Experience of
Job Loss, 41 Res. in Soc. Stratification and Mobility 81,
81-82 (2015).
There is no single explanation for employers’ discrimination against older job applicants. However, agerelated stereotypes – for example, that older workers
are resistant to change, slow, or difficult to train – persist among managers. Richard A. Posthuma & Michael
A. Campion, Age Stereotypes in the Workplace: Common Stereotypes, Moderators, and Future Research Directions, 35 J. Mgmt. 158, 159 & 162 (2009); Robert M.
McCann & Shaughan A. Keaton, A Cross Cultural Investigation of Age Stereotypes and Communication Perceptions of Older & Younger Workers in the USA and
Thailand, 39 Educ. Gerontology 326, 335 (2013) (“older
workers . . . were generally seen by young workers as
more uncomfortable with new technology, less flexible
and more cautious on the job, and more loyal”); Vincent

10
J. Roscigno, et al., Age Discrimination, Social Closure
and Employment, 86 Soc. Forces 313, 314 (2007); Gilbert C. Gee, et al., Age, Cohort and Perceived Age
Discrimination: Using the Life Course to Assess SelfReported Age Discrimination, 86 Soc. Forces 265, 268
(2007) (“employers and the lay public prefer workers
in their 30s and . . . negative attitudes begin to rise
around age 40”). One study showed that older applicants who tout their experience and maturity in order
to “proactively suggest that their age is associated with
qualities that employers value” fare worse than those
who deemphasize their age or stress their youthful
qualities. Marc Bendick Jr., et al., Employment Discrimination Against Older Workers: An Experimental
Study of Hiring Practices, 84 J. Aging & Soc. Pol’y 25,
40-41 (1996). Likewise, some employers assume that
younger people will work for lower wages, incur fewer
significant health expenses and take less time off
to deal with illness, and stay in their jobs longer.
Roscigno, et al., supra, at 315; see also Nicole Maestas
& Julie Zissimopoulos, How Longer Work Lives Ease
the Crunch of Population Aging, 24 J. Econ. Persps.
139, 152-53 (2010). Thus, decades after the Wirtz Report, “[e]vidence continues to mount that statistical
discrimination, judgment based on a group’s characteristics rather than the individual’s, is an important factor in the hiring and retention of older workers.” Id. In
this vein – and of particular relevance to disparate impact in hiring – one group of researchers reasoned that
“explicit ageism is largely invisible, yet discriminatory
patterns nevertheless manifest especially where the
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perceived costs of ageing employees outweigh what
employers deem as the benefits.” Roscigno, et al., supra, at 325.
“Few human resource management processes rival hiring in impact on the distribution of employment
opportunities and rewards.” Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana
P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Controlling Bias in Hiring, 68 J. Soc. Issues 238, 238 (2012).
Yet, initial hiring decisions are especially prone to
bias, because they are often made without detailed
knowledge of individual applicants or their past performance. Id. at 242-43. Without detailed, personalized information about applicants, employers can
easily fall back on stereotypes to winnow down the
pool.
Researchers have measured hiring bias against
older workers largely by comparing the reactions of
employers to resumes of comparably qualified older
and younger applicants.5 For example, one study
5

Older workers also self-report significant age-related bias
in the workplace, both in response to researchers, and in EEOC
charges alleging age discrimination. See, e.g., Sarah von Schrader
& Zafar E. Nazarov, Trends and Patterns in Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) Charges, 38 Research on Aging 580, 588
(2015); AARP, Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination
Act: National Public Opinion Report, 6 (2012) http://www.
aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/surveys_statistics/work_and_
retirement/powada-national.pdf (about one-third of older workers
report experiencing or witnessing age discrimination); Richard W.
Johnson & David Neumark, Age Discrimination, Job Separations,
an Employment Status of Older Workers: Evidence from SelfReports, 32 J. Hum. Resources 779, 782 (1997) (based on worker
self-reports, “age discrimination may be an important factor in
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compared employers’ reactions to otherwise-similar
job applicants who were aged 32 and 57 years old, respectively, and found that employers responded more
favorably to the younger applicant 42 percent of the
time, and more favorably to the older applicant just
one percent of the time. Marc Bendick, Jr., et al., No
Foot in the Door: An Experimental Study of Employment Discrimination Against Older Workers, 10 J. Aging & Social Pol’y 5, 10-11 (1999). A more recent, largescale study compared employers’ reactions to more
than 40,000 job applications, and found evidence of hiring discrimination against older women. David Neumark, et al., Is It Harder for Older Workers To Find
Jobs?, New and Improved Evidence from a Field
Experiment, 3 (2015) http://www.nber.org/papers/w21669.
Another similar study, focused on women, found that
“younger applicants are 42 percent more likely than
older applicants to be offered an interview in Massachusetts and 46 percent more likely in Florida.”
Joanna N. Lahey, Age, Women, and Hiring: An Experimental Study, 43 J. Hum. Resources 30, 46 (2008).
That means an older job seeker must send out eight
more resumes in Massachusetts and seven more in
Florida than her younger counterpart to get a single
interview. Id. at 37. In these terms, it is easy to see how
employers’ preferences for younger workers over their

determining job separations and employment status of older
workers”). Other research suggests workers are often correct in
perceiving discrimination. See Gee, et al., supra, at 281 (2007)
(“close match” between employers’ stated preferences for younger
workers and workers’ reported experiences of discrimination.).
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similarly qualified older counterparts can translate
into weeks or months of additional unemployment and
job-searching for older workers, if not total inability to
find a job.
B. Age Discrimination in Hiring Harms
Older Workers And the Economy
Americans are living longer and healthier lives,
and the population as a whole is aging. Neumark &
Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimination Laws Make Social Security Reforms More Effective?, supra, at 1. But
longer life expectancy means that Americans will either need to save more during the earlier years of their
working lives to see them through retirement, or –
more likely – work longer. Reflecting that dynamic, the
number of Americans in the labor force who were aged
45 years or older nearly doubled between 1990 and
2010, and individuals aged 55 years or older may comprise more than one-quarter of the labor force by 2020.
Von Schrader & Nazarov, supra, at 581.
Age discrimination in hiring has a complex set of
effects on older workers themselves and the economy
as a whole. First, preventing “[a]ge discrimination in
hiring is especially important” in allowing aging workers to remain in the workforce. Neumark, et al., Is It
Harder for Older Workers To Find Jobs?, supra, at 1
(emphasis in original). This is in part because aging
workers may need to change to a less physically demanding job, or find a part-time job to act as a bridge
to retirement; if they cannot, their alternatives will be
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to remain in an undesirable job for longer, or simply to
retire earlier. Id. But earlier-than-intended retirement
places aging workers at risk of slipping into poverty. In
a 2012 survey of 1,000 Americans aged 50 or older,
more than half of those who were not yet retired said
they were not close to being able to retire comfortably;
sixteen percent of those who were already retired predicted that their savings would run out, necessitating
a return to work. AARP, Protecting Older Workers
Against Discrimination Act, supra, at 5. Older widows
are especially at risk; they “suffer an average 30 percent drop in living standards upon widowhood and are
more likely to be living in poverty than are other
groups.” Lahey, supra, at 31; see also Administration on
Aging, US Department of Health & Human Services,
A Profile of Older Americans: 2014, 5 (2014), https://aoa.
acl.gov/aging_statistics/profile/2014/docs/2014-profile.pdf
(thirty-five percent of older women in 2014 were widows).
Further, older workers are becoming increasingly
likely to face layoffs or other job displacement relative
to their younger counterparts. Adams & Neumark, Age
Discrimination in US Labor Markets, supra, at 197-98;
Henry S. Farber, Job Loss in the Great Recession:
Historical Perspective From the Displaced Workers Survey, 1984-2010, 7 (2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w17040.pdf. And when job displacement occurs, discrimination in hiring (among other factors) means that
older workers also tend to face longer periods of unemployment than younger workers. Lahey, supra, at 46;
see also Neumark, Experimental Research on Labor
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Market Discrimination, supra, at 5; Lassus, et al., supra, at 81-82. Among those who lose their jobs, “older
workers have the lowest reemployment probabilities,
the longest time to reemployment, high probabilities of
part-time employment and the largest wage losses.”
Barry T. Hirsch, et al., Occupational Age Structure and
Access for Older Workers, 53 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev.
401, 402 (2000).
Because of those dynamics, older workers felt
acutely the effects of the 2007-2009 Great Recession.
During that time, unemployment durations “rose far
more dramatically” for older than younger workers,
and those who found new jobs tended to face much
larger earnings losses than their younger counterparts. David Neumark & Patrick Button, Did Age Discrimination Protections Help Older Workers Weather
the Great Recession?, 33 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 566,
566 (2014); see also Jessica Z. Rothenberg & Daniel S.
Gardner, Protecting Older Workers: The Failure of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 38 J.
Soc’y & Soc. Welfare 9, 22 (2011) (unemployment rate
for adults aged 55 or older more than doubled between
June 2008 and June 2009, whereas it increased 70 percent for the population at large, and older adults spent
an average of 30 weeks looking for a new job, compared
to a national average of 22 weeks); Farber, Job Loss
in the Great Recession, supra, at 23 (Great Recession
“[j]ob losers aged 55-64 earn 16 percent less than do
job losers aged 25-34. . . . The average earnings loss is
much larger when the worker had accumulated substantial tenure on the lost job”).
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When older people cannot find work, one alternative is to claim Social Security benefits earlier than
planned; indeed, many older Americans did just that
during the Great Recession, as they have during
other economic contractions. Matthew S. Rutledge &
Norma B. Coe, Great Recession-Induced Early Claimers: Who Are They? How Much Do They Lose?, Center
for Retirement Research at Boston College, 4 (2012),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/wp_201212-508.pdf. But claiming Social Security earlier means
a lower level of monthly benefits, making it more difficult for retirees to make ends meet, and with reverberations throughout the economy. Id.; Alicia H. Munnell
& Matthew S. Rutledge, The Effects of the Great Recession on the Retirement Security of Older Workers, 650
The ANNALS of the Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 124,
126 (2013) (discussing the effects of claiming social security early and explaining that “Social Security will
provide less in the future than it does today”); Gary
Koenig & Al Myles, Social Security’s Impact on the National Economy, AARP Public Policy Institute, 5-7
(2013), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/
public_policy_institute/econ_sec/2013/social-securityimpact-national-economy-AARP-ppi-econ-sec.pdf (analyzing multiplier effect of social security benefits). In
contrast, stronger protections against age discrimination allow older workers to obtain new jobs more easily,
delaying the age at which they claim Social Security
benefits. Neumark & Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimination Laws Make Social Security Reforms More Effective?, supra, at 1. This is good for older workers and the
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economy; the workers increase their savings and
avoid having to accept a lower level of benefits, while
also paying into the Social Security system for longer.
Neumark & Song, supra, at 31-32; Maestas & Zissimopoulos, supra, at 158.
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH SUGGESTS
THAT LIABILITY FOR DISPARATE IMPACT IN HIRING HELPS TO REDUCE
AGE DISCRIMINATION
Social science evidence discussed above suggests
that age discrimination in hiring remains significant.
Social science evidence also suggests, as explained below, that discrimination can be reduced by legal intervention, at least where threat of legal liability is
significant. Yet disparate treatment law alone does too
little to prevent discrimination caused by neutral policies that reflect stereotyped assessments of merit. See
Lauren B. Edelman, Working Law: Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil Rights 59-60 (2016) (arguing
that racial and gender segregation and other employment inequities persist because disparate treatment
law allows organizations to adopt symbolic nondiscrimination policies without addressing the practices
that perpetuate discrimination). This case is an example: assuming that people two or three years out of college and with less than eight years of sales experience
would be better territory managers reflects stereotyped thinking about sales and about age, and it resulted in less than one percent of those hired being
over 40, but proving the requirement was adopted with
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the intent to exclude workers protected by the ADEA
is not without difficulty. The availability of disparate
impact claims is important to uncover and eliminate
this form of age discrimination in hiring.
Further, given that workers can bring disparate
impact claims regarding decisions made after hiring,
the unavailability of disparate impact liability at the
hiring stage could create perverse incentives for employers. Neumark, Is It Harder for Older Workers To
Find Jobs?, supra, at 2. Where employers face greater
risks of liability if they fire (or otherwise disadvantage)
an older worker than if they simply do not hire older
workers in the first place, they will be better off discriminating at the outset than hiring an older worker
and risking a discrimination case later on. This risk is
already present to a degree, due to the difficulty of
winning failure-to-hire cases and the likelihood that
damages will be smaller in failure-to-hire than in termination cases. Neumark & Song, Do Stronger Age
Discrimination Laws Make Social Security Reforms
More Effective?, supra, at 2; see also Lahey, supra, at 31
(reasoning that “firms that wish to retain only a certain type of worker without being sued would prefer to
discriminate in the hiring stage” because “it is more
difficult for workers to determine why they failed to
receive an interview than it is for workers to determine
why they have been fired”); Neumark & Button, Did
Age Discrimination Protections Help Older Workers
Weather the Great Recession?, supra, at 566. But permitting older workers to pursue disparate impact
cases only after they have been hired would exacerbate
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this dynamic. Disparate impact liability for discriminatory hiring practices may be the best mechanism to
avoid this perverse incentive and change personnel
policies that, as in this case, are based on stereotypes
about the abilities of older workers.
Social scientific studies show that stronger age
discrimination laws are associated with less age discrimination without reducing labor market efficiency.
David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, Age Discrimination
Laws and Labor Market Efficiency, 107 J. Pol. Econ.
1081 (1999) (comparing age-earnings profiles in states
with stronger and weaker age discrimination laws).
One study found that older workers were less likely to
claim Social Security benefits in states with stronger
age discrimination laws, which suggests that older employees more easily find and retain employment where
age discrimination laws are stronger. Neumark &
Song, supra at 2. But because of the difficulty of measuring age discrimination and attributing differences in
employment of older workers to differences in law, see
Neumark & Button, supra, it is difficult to empirically
demonstrate the impact of age discrimination law. It is
possible, however, to extrapolate from the abundant research on race and gender to see that anti-discrimination
law generally, and the disparate impact framework
specifically, reduce employment discrimination in hiring.
Empirical social science research on employment
discrimination has found that anti-discrimination laws
are correlated with greater race and gender diversity
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in formerly white male job categories. Formal personnel policies in the absence of legal accountability have
been found to have no effects on the racial and gender
diversity of managers, but nondiscrimination policies
coupled with legal or supervisory accountability for results do have an effect. Frank Dobbin, et al., Rage
Against the Iron Cage: The Varied Effects of Bureaucratic Personnel Reforms on Diversity, 80 Am. Soc. Rev.
1014 (2015). Class action suits by both women and
Blacks increased their representation in management
by about 20 percent in the year following the suit, although women’s gains endured while Black gains
eroded to about ten percent after an additional year.
Sheryl Skaggs, Legal Political Pressures and African
American Access to Managerial Jobs, 74 Am. Soc. Rev.
225 (2009); Sheryl Skaggs, Producing Change or Bagging Opportunity? The Effects of Discrimination Litigation on Women in Supermarket Management, 113
Am. J. Soc. 1148 (2008). Similarly, when a court order
resulting from a discrimination charge or lawsuit includes managerial accountability for diversity gains,
the access of white women, black men, and black
women to managerial jobs increases. C. Elizabeth
Hirsh, The Strength of Weak Enforcement: The Impact
of Discrimination Charges on Sex and Race Segregation in the Workplace, 74 Am. Soc. Rev. 245 (2009);
C. Elizabeth Hirsh and Youngjoo Cha, Mandating
Change: The Impact of Court-Ordered Policy Changes
on Managerial Diversity, 70 Indus. and Lab. Rel. R. 42
(2016).
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Social scientists have also found that race and
gender workforce segregation declined during the period when there was vigorous enforcement of employment discrimination laws. One would expect vigorous
enforcement of age discrimination laws would similarly be effective in reducing age discrimination. Segregation of white men from black men and women of
all races declined dramatically during the 1973 – 1980
period, after Griggs. Kevin Stainback and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Documenting Desegregation: Racial
and Gender Segregation in Private-Sector Employment
Since the Civil Rights Act xxii, 128-30 (2012). Segregation between white men and black men dropped rapidly from the late 1960s to 1980, net of shifts caused by
changes in jobs and the economy. Id. at 128. The gender
segregation between white women and white men began to decline slightly later than race segregation
among men, but it too declined rapidly in the 1970s. Id.
at 130. The rapid gender desegregation of the 1970s
slowed after 1980 but continued to decline gradually
between 1980 and 2000, and then stopped. Id. at 168.
To determine whether the declines in discrimination were the result of voluntary compliance or
changes in attitudes independent of the threat of legal
enforcement, Stainback and Tomaskovich-Devey compared firms subject to scrutiny by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance (OFCC) and other comparable
firms. (The OFCC audits EEO data of federal contractors and, in theory, contractors can face adverse consequences for failing an audit.) Black men made larger
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and faster gains in advancement into managerial, professional, and craft jobs in OFCC-reporting firms than
in noncontractor firms during the period from the effective date of the Civil Rights Act to 1980. Id. at 143.
See also Frank Dobbin, Inventing Equal Opportunity
49-50 (2009) (defense contractors that faced debarment for discrimination hired nearly ten times the
number of blacks they hired prior to federal government threatening to debar companies that discriminated). During this period, class action suits were
associated with increased black employment and
movement into managerial jobs. Jonathan Leonard,
Employment and Occupational Advance Under Affirmative Action, 66 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 377 (1984). The
rapid decrease in occupational race segregation in the
early 1970s may have been caused by the fact that
class action suits result in legal commands to change
firm behavior and also serve as a threat to other firms.
John Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43
Stan. L. Rev. 983 (1991).
As noted, it is difficult to extrapolate from the data
on race and gender to age. Although social scientists
have concluded that the pre-1980 “progress toward racial desegregation in the private sector . . . was produced by regulatory or political pressure rather than
by changes in the industrial structure or labor supply,”
Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra, at 167, the regulatory pressure, attitude changes, and affirmative action did not extend from the Title VII context to the
ADEA. The ADEA did not have the early enforcement
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surge that Title VII did, as responsibility for its enforcement bounced from the Department of Labor to
the EEOC, and in the case of age there was no comparable consensus about the need for affirmative action
to head off social unrest. Compare, e.g., John David
Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action (1996). As
a result, social science evidence about the effect of vigorous enforcement of age discrimination law is not as
strong as the evidence about the effect of Title VII.
Nevertheless, the available data provide a basis
for inferring that the availability of disparate impact
hiring claims would eliminate stereotyped hiring criteria like the preference for recent college graduates at
issue here. Consent decrees or court orders prohibiting
use of discriminatory selection criteria reduce discrimination directly, as in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). Litigation reduces discrimination indirectly when HR departments or in-house counsel
fear litigation and direct firms to change policies that
cannot be justified as being reasonable. Human resource organizations follow court cases closely and
offer immediate updates to companies, frequently suggesting steps to take in response to court decisions. For
example, after Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems, 296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2002), vacated, 540
U.S. 581 (2004), when the Sixth Circuit held that workers over 40 could state a discrimination claim when
they received worse treatment than workers over 50,
organizations were quick to notify businesses even
before this Court granted review and vacated the Sixth
Circuit decision. See Gillian Flynn, The Maturing of

24
the ADEA, Workforce (October 2002), http://www.
workforce.com/2002/09/27/the-maturing-of-the-adea
(advising human resource departments to “ensure that
[they] have a justifiable business basis” for a change
in policies “before [they] enact” the policy to “insulate
[the company] against a disparate-impact claim”);
see also Jonathan Pont, Ruling Gives a New Basis
for Age-Bias Claims, Workforce (April 26, 2005), http://
www.workforce.com/2005/04/26/ruling-gives-a-new-basisfor-age-bias-claims/ (stating that after Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), companies should review
employment practices); Paul Salvatore, Age Case Tops
Supreme’s List, HUMAN RESOURCE EXECUTIVE ONLINE
(April 2, 2005), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/
story.jhtml?id=4278238&ss=disparate+impact&s=54#ctx
(advising HR departments to “carefully consider any
practices or policies . . . that may, unintentionally, have
a negative and disproportionate impact on employees
over 40” in light of Smith); Paul Gallagher, Age-Bias
Claims to Rise?, HUMAN RESOURCE EXECUTIVE ONLINE
(June 23, 2008), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/
story.jhtml?id=104331306&ss=disparate+impact&s=36
(discussing need for companies to develop policies governing layoffs in light of Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory, 553 U.S. 84 (2008)).
Disparate impact liability does more than spread
organizational awareness of the specific issues. Successful claims prompt broad changes in management
practices. History demonstrates that anti-discrimination
regulations “from the early 1960s stimulated corporate
America to develop the precursors to today’s diversity
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programs.” Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Origins and Effects of Corporate Diversity Programs, in
The Oxford Handbook of Diversity and Work 253, 254
(Quinetta M. Roberson, ed., 2013). These changes only
increased over time. For example, “Title VII lawsuits
and affirmative action compliance reviews [have] led
to increases in women’s and minorities’ share of management jobs, especially in periods and judicial circuits
wherein civil rights enforcement was strong.” Alexandra Kalev, et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action
and Diversity Policies, 71 Am. Soc. Rev. 589, 612 (2006).
The prospect of Title VII claims motivate companies to
adopt structures or practices to comply with the law.”
Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Structural Reform
of the American Workplace, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1519,
1584 (2014) (discussing widespread adoption of antiharassment policies). Similarly, here, allowing disparate impact in hiring claims under the ADEA will help
prompt companies to make the necessary structural
changes to avoid discrimination.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant
certiorari on the first question presented.
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